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Abstract
Multi-agent coordination problems often require agents to exchange state information in order to reach some
collective goal, such as agreement on a final state value. In some cases, it is feasible that opportunistic agents
may deceptively report false state values for their own benefit, e.g., to claim a larger portion of shared resources.
Motivated by such cases, this paper presents a multi-agent coordination framework which disincentivizes opportunistic
misreporting of state information. This paper focuses on multi-agent coordination problems that can be stated as
nonlinear programs, with non-separable constraints coupling the agents. In this setting, an opportunistic agent may be
tempted to skew the problem’s constraints in its favor to reduce its local cost, and this is exactly the behavior we seek
to disincentivize. The framework presented uses a primal-dual approach wherein the agents compute primal updates
and a centralized cloud computer computes dual updates. All computations performed by the cloud are carried out in
a way that enforces joint differential privacy, which adds noise in order to dilute any agent’s influence upon the value
of its cost function in the problem. We show that this dilution deters agents from intentionally misreporting their states
to the cloud, and present bounds on the possible cost reduction an agent can attain through misreporting its state.
This work extends our earlier work on incorporating ordinary differential privacy into multi-agent optimization, and
we show that this work can be modified to provide a disincentivize for misreporting states to the cloud. Numerical
results are presented to demonstrate convergence of the optimization algorithm under joint differential privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent optimization problems have found applications in a range of research areas, including power systems
in [17], machine learning in [3], sensor networks in [5], and robotics in [19]. Solutions to some problems in these
applications rely on the implicit assumption that all agents share correct, truthful information with others in a
network. However, one can envision a scenario in which deceitful agents do not honestly share their data, instead
sharing false information that will skew the behavior of the system in their favor. For example, a homeowner
connected to a smart power grid may report a false value for his or her power usage in order to save money. This
paper considers optimization problems with agents that may be intentionally deceitful for their own benefit, and it
provides a method for disincentivizing untruthful behavior when teams of agents are collectively optimizing.
We reduce the incentive to share false information by using joint differential privacy, defined in [13], to limit the
possible decrease in cost an agent can achieve through intentionally misreporting its state. Joint differential privacy
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adds noise to reduce the ability of an agent to benefit from reporting false information, and was first introduced
for this purpose in [13] to promote truthful sharing of information by the players in a class of games. This work
was applied specifically to optimization problems arising from distributed electric vehicle charging in [11], as well
as to linearly separable optimization problems in [12].
The developments in this paper differ from those in [11] and [12], as well as some other work on private
optimization, e.g., [10], in two key ways. First, the work in [11], [12], and [10] uses differential privacy as it
was originally defined in [7] to keep some static object, such as a constraint function, private. Our work focuses
on trajectory-level privacy for state trajectories that are dynamically generated as an optimization algorithm is
executed. In applications such as phase synchronization in smart power grids, each iterate of an optimization
algorithm corresponds to a physical state at some point in time, and an agent’s contribution to the optimization
process is its whole state trajectory. Applying joint differential privacy in such applications should therefore be done
at the trajectory level, and implementing joint differential privacy for trajectory-level data is most naturally done
using the dynamical systems formulation of differential privacy. Therefore, this paper uses trajectory-level privacy
as defined in [15], rather than privacy for databases as in [7].
This form of privacy is not only better suited to the applications of interest, but also allows privacy guarantees
to hold across infinite time horizons which, in many cases, cannot be attained using privacy for databases. To our
knowledge, this paper is the first use of joint differential privacy at the trajectory level. The second key difference
between the existing literature and this paper is the class of optimization problems solved. We apply joint differential
privacy in a general multi-agent nonlinear programming setting, incorporating non-separable functional constraints
that are also possibly nonlinear, which differs from work done in [11], [12], and [10] where either linear or affine
constraints are considered.
To solve such problems, a cloud computer is added to the team of agents to serve as a trusted central aggregator,
also sometimes called a “curator” in the privacy literature. This architecture was previously used for privately solving
multi-agent nonlinear programs in [9], in which honest agents seek to protect sensitive data from eavesdroppers
via ordinary differential privacy. The work in [16] suggests that any differential privacy implementation provides
some disincentive against untruthful information sharing, and the current paper uses the notion of joint differential
privacy to formally provide this guarantee in the framework developed in [9]. Accordingly, the technical novelty
of this paper is not in the algorithm used to solve problems, but in the theoretical performance guarantees that are
provided using this framework; the work in [9] focuses exclusively on protecting sensitive data, but the current
paper focuses on the problem of preventing untruthful behavior by the agents. The technical contribution of this
paper thus consists of adapting our existing privacy framework to the problem of incentivizing truthful behavior by
the agents, and quantifying the extent to which any agent can benefit from untruthful behavior.
Several existing approaches use behavioral analysis to identify untruthful agents, including those in [4] and [8]. In
this paper, an agent’s local state updates rely on a local objective function and local constraint set that are considered
sensitive, and therefore these local data are not shared with any other agent. As a result, the correct next value of
an agent’s state is only known to that agent, and a behavioral analysis approach cannot be used here because no
outside observer can determine what any agent’s future states should be. Rather than detecting untruthful behavior,
this paper seeks to prevent it outright by reducing the incentive to share untruthful information via joint differential
privacy. The principle underlying this application of joint differential privacy is that adding noise to the system can
make each agent’s cost insensitive to changes in the agent’s state trajectory. The amount of noise added must be
calibrated to the system in order to dilute the effect of an agent reporting an untruthful state to the cloud, and this
paper presents this calibration for a general multi-agent nonlinear program in terms of constants pertaining to the
problem.
The problems considered consist of a collection of agents, each with a local objective function and local set
constraint, and ensemble state constraints that jointly constrain the agents. A primal-dual approach is used, in
which the agents update their own states, which are the problem’s primal variables, and the cloud updates the
problem’s dual variables. Naturally, the constraints in this problem will usually lead to higher costs for each agent
than a comparable unconstrained problem. As a result, some of the agents may wish to skew the constraints in
their favor. One way they may do so is by reporting false state information to the cloud in order to loosen the
constraints’ effects on their on their own states, thereby giving the untruthful agents a lower cost. This manipulation
of the constraints will result in an unequal distribution of the burden of these constraints by tightening them on
honest agents. Therefore, this form of untruthful behavior is disincentivized using joint differential privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the necessary optimization background, the
structure of communications in the system, and formally states the joint differentially private optimization problem
that is the focus of the paper. Then, Section III reviews joint differential privacy, and Section IV presents the
proposed joint differentially private algorithm. Next, Section V proves the main result of the paper on limiting an
agent’s incentive to misreport its states to the cloud. Section VI then presents simulation results and Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND ON OPTIMIZATION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
This section presents the multi-agent optimization problem of interest and an optimization algorithm that will later
be used to solve a joint differentially private version of this problem. This section also describes the cloud-based
architecture used to solve this problem. Throughout the paper, ∇xi denotes the partial derivative with respect to
xi, and hxi denotes the partial derivative of the function h with respect to xi.
A. Optimization Problem Formulation
Consider a problem consisting of N agents indexed over i ∈ [N ] := {1, . . . , N}. Agent i has state xi ∈ Rni
with ni ∈ N and a local set constraint of the form xi ∈ Xi ⊂ Rni . The diameter of Xi is denoted by Di :=
maxx1,x2∈Xi ‖x1 − x2‖1. Agent i also has a local objective function fi : Rni → R depending only upon its own
state. Agent i’s local data are subject to the following assumption.
Assumption 1: For all i ∈ [N ], fi is C2 and convex in xi, and Xi is non-empty, compact, and convex. 4
Assumption 1 implies that fi is Lipschitz and its Lipschitz1 constant is denoted by Ki. In particular, Assumption
1 allows for convex polynomial objectives and box constraints, which are common in multi-agent optimization
problems. Both fi and Xi are considered sensitive information and are therefore not shared with the other agents
or with the cloud. For simplicity of notation, define the set X := X1 × · · · ×XN ⊂ Rn, where n =
∑
i∈[N ] ni.
The agents’ individual set constraints require x ∈ X , where x is the ensemble state vector of the network, defined
as x =
(
xT1 , . . . x
T
N
)T ∈ X , and where Assumption 1 provides that X is non-empty, compact, and convex.
The agents are together subject to global inequality constraints g(x) ≤ 0, where g : Rn → Rm. The functional
constraints in g are subject to the following assumption.
Assumption 2:
i. For all j ∈ [m], the constraint gj is C2 and convex in x.
ii. There exists a point x¯ ∈ X such that g(x¯) < 0. 4
Assumption 2.i. admits a wide variety of constraint functions, e.g., any convex polynomials. Assumption 2.ii. is
known as Slater’s condition, e.g., Assumption 6.4.2 in [2], and, in conjunction with Assumption 2.i., guarantees
that strong duality holds. Assumption 2 implies that g and each gxi are Lipschitz. Their Lipschitz constants are
denoted by Kg and Lg,i, respectively.
Summing the per-agent objective functions gives the ensemble objective f(x) =
∑
i∈[N ] fi(xi), which is C
2 and
convex in x because of Assumption 1. Together f , g, and X comprise the following ensemble-level optimization
problem.
Problem 0: (Preliminary; no joint differential privacy yet)
minimize f(x)
subject to g(x) ≤ 0
x ∈ X. ♦
We now detail how to solve Problem 0 in the cloud-based system, and then give a unified problem statement,
including incentivizing truthful behavior, in Problem 1 below.
The Lagrangian associated with Problem 0 is
L(x, µ) = f(x) + µT g(x),
where µ ∈ Rm+ is the dual vector associated with Problem 0 and Rm+ denotes the non-negative orthant of Rm.
Seminal work of [14] shows that a point xˆ ∈ X is a solution to Problem 0 if and only if there exists a point
µˆ ∈ Rm+ such that (xˆ, µˆ) is a saddle point of L. This saddle point condition can be compactly expressed by
requiring
L(xˆ, µ) ≤ L(xˆ, µˆ) ≤ L(x, µˆ) for all (x, µ) ∈ X × Rm+ , (1)
and an optimal primal-dual pair (xˆ, µˆ) exists under Assumptions 1 and 2.
1All Lipschitz constants in this paper are with respect to the metric induced by the 1-norm.
For the forthcoming optimization algorithm, Equation (II-A) is used to define an upper bound on the norm of µˆ,
stated in the following lemma. It uses the Slater point x¯ from Assumption 2.ii. and any lower bound on f over X ,
denoted flower, which exists under Assumption 1.
Lemma 1: For (xˆ, µˆ) a saddle point of L,
µˆ ∈M :=
µ ∈ Rm+ : ‖µ‖1 ≤ f(x¯)− flowermin
j∈[m]
{−gj(x¯)}
 .
Proof: See Section II-A in [9]. 
Using the fact that a saddle point of L provides a solution to Problem 0, the remainder of the paper focuses
on finding such saddle points. The algorithm used for this purpose includes an iterative Tikhonov regularization
with an asymptotically vanishing stepsize, and was stated in [1] for deterministic variational inequalities and later
in [18] for stochastic problems. To help describe the communications and computations in the cloud-based system,
we provide the general deterministic form of this algorithm now, though in Section IV stochasticity is introduced
when the algorithm is made joint differentially private. The saddle-point finding algorithm uses the coupled update
equations
x(k + 1) = ΠX [x(k)− γk (Lx(k) + αkx(k))] (2a)
µ(k + 1) = ΠM [µ(k) + γk (Lµ(k)− αkµ(k))] , (2b)
where ΠX and ΠM are the Euclidean projections onto X and M , respectively. This update law will be referred to
as Update (1). Here, γk is a stepsize and αk is the regularization parameter, and the values of both will be provided
in Theorem 1 in Section IV.
B. Optimizing via the Cloud
We now elaborate on the cloud-based architecture to be used and the means of executing Update (1) on the cloud
and agents. To enforce joint differential privacy, the agents do not directly share any information with each other.
Instead, the agents route messages through a trusted cloud computer which aggregates all states in the network,
performs computations involving these states, and makes the results of these computations joint differentially private
before sending them to the agents.
Splitting Equation (1) into each agent’s states gives the update
xi(k + 1) = ΠXi
[
xi(k)− γk (Lxi(k) + αkxi(k))
]
for agent i, where expanding the term containing Lxi gives
xi(k + 1) = ΠXi
[
xi(k)− γk
(
∇xifi
(
xi(k)
)
+ gxi
(
x(k)
)T
µ(k) + αkxi(k)
) ]
. (3)
Importantly, the right-hand side of Equation (II-B) contains two terms which agent i cannot compute on its own:
gxi
(
x(k)
)
, because it is a function of every state in the network, and µ(k), because its update law relies on
g
(
x(k− 1)), which is also a function of every state in the network. For this reason, the cloud computer is used to
compute µ(k) and gxi
(
x(k)
)
for each i ∈ [N ] at all timesteps k.
Step 4 Step 3
Step 1 Step 2
Compile x(k)
1
...
...
...
...
...
N
Send x1(k)
(truthful)
Send x′N (k)
(untruthful)
Compute
gxi(x(k))Tµ(k)
1
N
...
...
...
...
...
Send
gx1(x(k))Tµ(k)
Send
gxN (x(k))Tµ(k)
Compute
µ(k + 1) = · · ·
1
N
...
Compute
x1(k+1)= · · ·
Compute
xN(k+1)= · · ·
Fig. 1. The four steps of a communications cycle in the cloud-based system. First, each agent sends its state to the cloud. Second, the cloud
performs centralized computations required by the agents. Third, the cloud sends the results of these computations to the agents. Fourth, agent
i computes xi(k+ 1) and the cloud computes µ(k+ 1) and this process repeats. In Step 1 depicted here, agent N is misreporting its state to
the cloud by sending x′N (k) instead of xN (k). As the algorithm progresses this untruthful state propagates through the system.
Four actions occur within timestep k. First, agent i sends xi(k) to the cloud and the cloud assembles the ensemble
state vector x(k). Second, the cloud computes gxi
(
x(k)
)
for every i ∈ [N ]. Third, the cloud sends gxi
(
x(k)
)T
µ(k)
to agent i. Fourth, the cloud computes µ(k + 1) and simultaneously agent i computes xi(k + 1), and then this
process repeats. This exchange of information is depicted in Figure 1. In the upper-left panel of Figure 1, agents
1 through N − 1 report their actual state to the cloud, while agent N misreports its state to the cloud by sending
some x′N (k) instead of xN (k). The arrows connecting boxes indicate how misreported states propagate through
the system, eventually affecting all agents’ states. The cloud’s computations in Steps 2 and 4 will be modified in
Section III to introduce joint differential privacy, though the overall communications structure will remain the same.
To reflect that agent i receives the vector gxi
(
x(k)
)T
µ(k) from the cloud without knowing gxi
(
x(k)
)
or µ(k)
individually, agent i’s update law is rewritten as
xi(k + 1) = ΠXi
[
xi(k)− γk
(∇ifi(xi(k))+ qi(k) + αkxi(k)) ],
where Rni 3 qi(k) := gxi
(
x(k)
)T
µ(k). As in Equation (1), the cloud computes the dual update according to
µ(k + 1) = ΠM [µ(k) + γk (Lµ(k)− αkµ(k))] ,
C. Full Problem Statement
We now state the algorithm that will be used throughout the remainder of the paper. Below that, we identify the
potential for misreporting states in this algorithm and state the problem that is later solved using joint differential
privacy.
Algorithm 1:
Step 0: For all i ∈ [N ], initialize agent i with xi(0), Xi, fi, {αk}k∈N, and {γk}k∈N. Initialize the cloud with x¯, g,
flower, {αk}k∈N, and {γk}k∈N. Let the cloud compute M before the system begins optimizing. Set k = 0.
Step 1: For all i ∈ [N ], the cloud computes qi(k) and sends it to agent i.
Step 2: Agent i computes
xi(k + 1) = ΠXi
[
xi(k)− γk
(∇ifi(xi(k))+ qi(k) + αkxi(k)) ],
and sends a state value xi(k + 1) to the cloud.
Step 3: The cloud computes
µ(k + 1) = ΠM [µ(k) + γk (Lµ(k)− αkµ(k))] .
Step 4: Set k := k + 1 and return to Step 1. ♦
In Step 2 of Algorithm 1, agent i may report a false state value to the cloud, sending some x˜i(k+1) 6= xi(k+1).
This is the misreporting behavior that this paper seeks to prevent using the cloud. The only influence the cloud
has upon agent i is through qi(k), and therefore the cloud must compute qi(k) in a way that incentivizes agent i
to honestly report its state. The incentivization of this behavior is stated as Problem 1 below, and the remainder of
the paper focuses on solving Problem 1.
Problem 1: Execute Algorithm 1 with the cloud computing qi(k) in a way that incentivizes agent i to honestly
report xi(k + 1) in Step 2, while still converging to a minimum. ♦
It is assumed that each agent ultimately wants the constraints g to be satisfied, as would be the case when g
corresponds to some mission-critical conditions that must be satisfied by the agents. However, an agent may wish
to reduce the impact g has upon its own state in order to reduce its cost. One way of affecting g for this purpose is
by reporting false states to the cloud over time; because all agents want g to be satisfied, a misreporting agent will
still use qi(k) from the cloud in its state updates, but an agent can substantially influence these messages for its
own benefit through misreport. In response to misreported states, other agents’ messages from the cloud in Update
(1) will be affected in a way that compensates for agent i’s false reported states, thereby resulting in an unfair
distribution of the burden of g.
This behavior cannot be detected by the other agents or the cloud because only agent i knows fi and Xi,
making no other entity in the network capable of determining what agent i’s state should be (cf. Equation (1)).
Therefore, rather than detecting manipulation of g, we seek to prevent this behavior. Joint differential privacy
provides a framework for incentivizing truthful sharing of information and it is used here to prevent the agents
from manipulating g.
Because agents are opportunistic but not malicious, they may send untruthful states to the cloud, but they will not
send states that harm the system or prevent convergence of Algorithm 1. As a result, a misreported state trajectory
will have some relationship to an agent’s true state trajectory and this relationship is used in defining adjacency
of signals in our joint differential privacy implementation. The next section details the manner in which noise is
added to qi(k) using joint differential privacy, and Section IV shows that this noise still allows for Algorithm 1 to
reach a minimum.
III. JOINT DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
This section recalls necessary details from both ordinary differential privacy and joint differential privacy. Then
it presents the joint differential privacy mechanism that will be implemented on the preceding cloud architecture. It
is critically important to note that while this section discusses privacy, the ultimate goal is to apply joint differential
privacy to induce truthful sharing of states. All of the content on privacy in this section should therefore be
understood as making progress toward inducing truthful behavior.
A. Differential Privacy Background
Differential privacy as described in [7] was originally designed to keep individual database entries private
whenever a database is queried, and this is done by adding noise to the responses to such queries. This idea
was extended to dynamical systems in [15] in order to keep inputs to a system private from anyone observing the
outputs of that system. It is the dynamical systems notion of differential privacy that is used below.
The key idea behind differential privacy is that noise is added to make “adjacent” inputs produce “similar”
outputs, and these notions are made rigorous below. As above, let there be N users, with the ith user contributing
a signal ui ∈ ˜`sipi . The space ˜`sipi is the space of sequences of si-vectors in which every finite truncation of every
element has finite pi-norm. More explicitly, with ui(k) ∈ Rsi denoting the kth element of the signal ui, define the
truncation operator Pt according to
Ptu =
u(k) k ≤ t0 k > t .
Then ui ∈ ˜`sipi if and only if Ptui ∈ `sipi for all t ∈ N. The full input space is then defined by the Cartesian product
˜`s
p =
∏n
i=1
˜`si
pi . This paper focuses on the case where pi = 1 for all i ∈ [N ].
To formalize the notion of adjacency of inputs in ˜`sp, we define a binary, symmetric adjacency relation Adj
i
B , which
is parameterized by B > 0 and an index i ∈ [N ]. Its definition uses the notation u−i = (u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , uN ).
The adjacency relation takes the form AdjiB : ˜`
s
p × ˜`sp → {0, 1} and has the following definition, as stated in [15].
Definition 1: Two inputs u, u˜ ∈ ˜`sp satisfy AdjiB(u, u˜) = 1 for some i ∈ [N ] if and only if ‖ui − u˜i‖pi ≤
B and u−i = u˜−i. The signals u and u˜ are then said to be adjacent with respect to agent i. If i is arbitrary, the
relation AdjB is used, and u and u˜ are simply called adjacent. 
This section maintains use of the symbol u for system inputs (rather than x as will be in subsequent sections)
to maintain continuity with the references cited here for private dynamical systems.
Inputs from ˜`sp are assumed to pass into a causal, deterministic system G, which produces outputs in ˜`rq . To define
when two outputs are “similar,” the notion of a mechanism is used. In the context of private dynamical systems,
a mechanism is a means of adding noise to an otherwise deterministic system to provide privacy to that system’s
inputs. Formally, for a fixed a probability space (Ω,F ,P), a mechanism is a map of the form
M : ˜`sp × Ω→ ˜`rq.
The mechanism M must provide differential privacy to its input trajectories, which fundamentally means that the
output of M should be insensitive to changes in its inputs. Differential privacy captures this notion by requiring
that, whenever AdjB(u, u˜) holds, the probability distributions of Mu and Mu˜ satisfy
P(Mu ∈ S) ≤ eP(Mu˜ ∈ S)
for all S in an appropriate σ-algebra.
Using a result from the literature, we now state a finite-time criterion which holds if and only if M keeps entire
trajectories private. Below, the notation v0:k :=
(
v(0), . . . , v(k)
)
is used to refer to the first k+ 1 entries of v ∈ ˜`rq .
Lemma 2: Let  ≥ 0 be given. For a dynamical system, a mechanism M is -differentially private if and only
if, for all u, u˜ satisfying AdjB(u, u˜) = 1 and for all times k,
P
(
(M(u))0:k ∈ A
) ≤ eP((M(u˜))0:k ∈ A) for all A ∈ B(k+1)r,
where Bd is the Borel sigma-algebra on Rd and r is the dimension of the output space.
Proof: See Lemma 2 in [15]. 
In Lemma 2, the value of  determines the level of privacy afforded to the input signals, and decreasing its value
leads to improved privacy at the cost of adding higher variance noise. Typical values of  in the literature range
from 0.1 to ln 3.
B. Joint Differential Privacy
We now elaborate on the application of joint differential privacy to Problem 1. To promote truth-telling behaviors,
limits are imposed on the ability of any agent to reduce its cost by reporting a false state trajectory to the cloud.
These limits are enforced using joint differential privacy, which is a relaxation of ordinary differential privacy for
use in multi-agent systems, and it will be shown that this framework is sufficient for the goal of reducing an agent’s
ability to benefit from misreporting its state. For joint differential privacy, the “system” of interest is comprised by
the computations the cloud carries out in accordance with Update (1), and this point is discussed further below.
For now it suffices to point out that the output of this system is a tuple of private forms of all qi’s. Denoting the
private form of qi(k) by q˜i(k) (whose exact form will be given later), the output of the cloud at time k is denoted
by
y(k) =
(
q˜1(k), . . . , q˜N (k)
)
.
Let M denote a mechanism for joint differential privacy and let M−i denote the same mechanism with the ith
output removed, i.e., the output of M−i is
y−i(k) =
(
q˜1(k), . . . , q˜i−1(k), q˜i+1(k), . . . , q˜N (k)
)
.
A mechanism M is joint differentially private if, for any i ∈ [N ], M−i preserves differential privacy for inputs
adjacent with respect to i. Joint differential privacy for databases has been defined in [13], though, to our knowledge,
it has not yet been used for dynamical systems. Using Lemma 2 in [15], the following lemma states a finite-time
criterion for trajectory-level joint differential privacy.
Lemma 3: (Joint differential privacy for dynamical systems) Let the privacy parameter  ≥ 0 be given and let
M be a mechanism whose output is an N -tuple. Then M is -joint differentially private if and only if, for any
i ∈ [N ], for all u, u˜ ∈ ˜`sp satisfying AdjiB(u, u˜) = 1, all times k, and all A ∈ B(k+1)(n−ni), M satisfies
P
(
(M−i(u))0:k ∈ A
) ≤ eP((M−i(u˜))0:k ∈ A)
where Bd is the Borel sigma-algebra on Rd. 
Joint differential privacy guarantees that when agent i’s input changes by a small amount, the outputs corre-
sponding to other agents do not change by much. A useful characteristic of both ordinary and joint differential
privacy is their resilience to post-processing, which guarantees that post-hoc transformations of private data cannot
weaken the privacy guarantees afforded to that data. This result is formalized below.
Lemma 4: (Resilience to post-processing; [6, Proposition 2.1]) Let M be an -differentially private mechanism
and let f be a function such that the composition f ◦M is well-defined. Them f ◦M is also -differentially private.

C. The Laplace Mechanism
To enforce differential privacy for a particular choice of , noise must be added somewhere in the system, and
the distribution of this noise must be determined. One common mechanism in the literature draws noise from the
Laplace distribution, used in both [7] and [15], and this mechanism is used to provide -joint differential privacy.
To define this mechanism, the notion of the `p sensitivity of a system is now introduced.
Definition 2: The `p sensitivity of a deterministic, causal system G is defined as
∆pG = sup
u,u˜:AdjB(u,u˜)=1
‖G(u)− G(u˜)‖`p . 
The Laplace mechanism is stated in terms of the `1 sensitivity of a system. Below, the notation Lap(b) denotes
a scalar Laplace distribution with mean zero and scale parameter b, i.e.,
Lap(b) :=
1
2b
exp
(
−|x|
b
)
.
Lemma 5: (Laplace mechanism; [15, Theorem 4]) Let  ≥ 0 be given. The Laplace mechanism defined by
M(u) = G(u) + w
with w(k) ∼ Lap(b)r is -differentially private for b ≥ ∆1G/, with r the dimension of the output space of the
system. 
Lemma 5 says that one can make a system private by adding noise drawn from a Laplace distribution to that
system’s output at each timestep. This idea is implemented for Problem 1 in the next section.
IV. OPTIMIZING UNDER JOINT DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section, the privacy results in Section III are applied to Problem 1, and Algorithm 1 is made joint
differentially private. Formally, g and gxi are treated as memoryless dynamical systems, and joint differential
privacy is used to ensure that they keep the agents’ state trajectories, which are the inputs to these systems, private.
A. Stochastic Optimization Algorithm
From Lemma 3, we see that enforcing joint differential privacy for the states in the network requires that the
cloud make qi(k) := gxi
(
x(k)
)T
µ(k) private before it is sent to agent i. To make gxi(x(k)) private, noise can
be added to it directly and this is done below. To make µ(k) private, we use the fact that computing µ(k) relies
on g(x(k − 1)), and add noise to make g(x(k − 1)) private. Then computing µ(k) is joint differentially private
by the post-processing property in Lemma 4. Similarly, if the noisy forms of both gxi(x(k)) and µ(k) are joint
differentially private, their product is as well, again by Lemma 4. Adding noise in this way, Algorithm 1 is modified
to state the joint differentially private optimization algorithm below.
Algorithm 2:
Step 0: For all i ∈ [N ], initialize agent i with xi(0), Xi, fi, {αk}k∈N, and {γk}k∈N. Initialize the cloud with x¯, g,
flower, {αk}k∈N, and {γk}k∈N. Let the cloud compute M before the system begins optimizing. Set k = 0.
Step 1: For all i ∈ [N ], the cloud computes
q˜i(k) :=
(
gxi
(
x(k)
)
+ wi(k)
)T
µ(k) and sends it to agent i.
Step 2: Agent i computes
xi(k + 1) = ΠXi
[
xi(k)− γk
(∇ifi(xi(k))+ q˜i(k) + αkxi(k)) ],
and sends a state value xi(k + 1) to the cloud.
Step 3: The cloud computes
µ(k + 1) = ΠM [µ(k) + γk (Lµ(k) + wg(k)− αkµ(k))] .
Step 4: Set k := k + 1 and return to Step 1. ♦
To solve Problem 1, Algorithm 2 must implement joint differential privacy using the noise terms wg and wi,
while still converging to a minimum. The following theorem gives conditions on wg and each wi under which
convergence to a minimum is guaranteed. Then Theorem 2 shows that joint differential privacy is achieved under
these conditions, and Section V shows that each agent’s incentive for misreport is indeed limited due to joint
differential privacy.
Theorem 1: Let (xˆ, µˆ) denote the least-norm saddle point of L. Algorithm 2 satisfies
lim
k→∞
E
[‖x(k)− xˆ‖22] = 0 and lim
k→∞
E
[‖µ(k)− µˆ‖22] = 0
if i. wi(k) and wg(k) have zero mean for all k
ii. αk = α¯k−c1 and γk = γ¯k−c2 , where 0 < c1 < c2, c1 + c2 < 1, 0 < α¯, and 0 < γ¯.
Proof: See [18, Theorem 6]. 
It remains to be shown that Condition i of Theorem 1 can be satisfied when joint differential privacy is
implemented, and this is done next.
B. Calibrating Noise for Joint Differential Privacy
Here the systems being made private are g and gxi , and the mechanisms acting for joint differential privacy
add noise to g(x(k − 1)) when computing µ(k) and add noise to gxi(x(k)) when computing q˜i(k). It was shown
in Section III that the noise added in Algorithm 2 will enforce -joint differential privacy as long as it has large
enough variance. To determine the variance of noise that must be added by the Laplace mechanism, bounds are
derived on the `1 sensitivity of each gxi and g below.
Lemma 6: For the relation AdjB , the `1 sensitivities of gxi and g satisfy ∆1gxi ≤ Lg,iB and ∆1g ≤ KgB.
Proof: See [9]. 
Using Lemmas 5 and 6, we see that if wi(k) ∼ Lap(bi) with bi ≥ ∆1gxi/ and wg(k) ∼ Lap(bg) with
bg ≥ ∆1g/ for all k, then all states are afforded (ordinary) -differential privacy in Algorithm 2. It turns out that
this privacy and its resilience to post-processing imply that -joint differential privacy holds as well, which is stated
formally in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Consider the mechanism M defined by
M(x(k)) = (q˜1(k), . . . , q˜N (k)),
with q˜i(k) :=
(
gxi
(
x(k)
)
+ wi(k)
)T
µ(k) as defined in Algorithm 2 and µ(k) computed as in Algorithm 2. At
each time k, if wi(k) ∼ Lap(bi) with bi ≥ ∆1gxi/ and wg(k) ∼ Lap(bg) with bg ≥ ∆1g/, then M is -joint
differentially private.
Proof: We examine M−i for an arbitrary i ∈ [N ] whose output at time k is
M−i
(
x(k)
)
= (q˜1(k), . . . , q˜i−1(k), q˜i+1(k), . . . , q˜N (k)) .
Examining some j ∈ [N ]\{i}, the jth output Mj
(
x(k)
)
is
Mj
(
x(k)
)
= q˜j(k) :=
(
gxj
(
x(k)
)
+ wj(k)
)T
µ(k).
In light of the fact that wg(k−1) ∼ Lap(bg) with bg ≥ ∆1g/, we see that µ(k) keeps x(k−1) -differentially private.
Similarly, gxj
(
x(k)
)
+ wj(k) keeps x(k) -differentially private because wj(k) ∼ Lap(bj) and bj ≥ ∆1gxj/. By
Lemma 4, the product q˜j(k) =
(
gxj
(
x(k)
)
+ wj(k)
)T
µ(k) keeps x -differentially private because it is the result
of post-processing two differentially private quantities. By the same reasoning,
M−i
(
x(k)
)
=
(
q˜1(k), . . . , q˜i−1(k), q˜i+1(k), . . . , q˜N
)
simply post-processes differentially private information. From Lemma 3 we conclude thatM is -joint differentially
private. 
The next section describes the application of this mechanism to inducing approximately-truthful behavior in
multi-agent optimization through the computation of β-approximate minima.
V. COMPUTING β-APPROXIMATE MINIMA
This section presents the main result of the paper: joint differential privacy results in there being only minimal
incentive for an agent to misreport its state to the cloud. Toward showing this result, a uniform upper bound on fi
over Xi is first presented.
Lemma 7: Let x¯ denote a Slater point for g. Then for all i ∈ [N ], fi(xi) ≤ λi for all xi ∈ Xi, where
λi := fi(x¯i) +KiDi.
Proof: Using the Mean-Value Theorem and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
fi(xi) = fi(x¯i) +∇fi(zi)T (xi − x¯i)
≤ fi(x¯i) + ‖∇ifi(zi)‖ · ‖xi − x¯i‖,
for some zi ∈ Xi. The result follows by bounding ‖∇ifi(zi)‖ by Ki and bounding ‖xi − x¯i‖ by Di. 
The next lemma bounds the difference in fi at points along two feasible state trajectories for agent i.
Lemma 8: For any x1i , x
2
i ∈ ˜`sipi and any time k, one finds∣∣fi(x1i (k))− fi(x2i (k))∣∣ ≤ ρi := min{KiDi, 2λi}.
Proof: Using the Lipschitz property of fi,∣∣f(x1i (k))− f(x2i (k))∣∣ ≤ Ki‖x1i (k)− x2i (k)‖1 ≤ KiDi.
On the other hand, the triangle inequality gives∣∣f(x1i (k))− f(x2i (k))∣∣ ≤ |f(x1i (k))|+ |f(x2i (k))| ≤ 2λi,
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 7. 
The main result of the paper is now presented. Below, each expected value is over the randomness introduced by
the mechanismM. For clarity, this theorem tracks the state agent i has reported to the cloud and the state trajectory
of every other agent. The notation E[fi
(
xi(k)
)|yi, v−i] is used to denote agent i’s cost at time k when agent i has
reported the trajectory yi to the cloud and every other agent has followed the trajectory v. The symbol xi is always
used as the argument to fi because fi always depends on the true state of agent i, not the state it reports.
Theorem 3: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let the agents and cloud execute Algorithm 2 with the cloud
implementing the mechanism M. Then for  ∈ (0, 1), all agents sharing their true states in Algorithm 2 results
in a β-approximate minimum. In particular, at all times k and for any state trajectories x, x˜ ∈ ˜`sp satisfying
AdjiB(x, x˜) = 1, we have
E[fi(xi(k))|xi, x−i] ≤ E[fi(xi(k))|x′i, x˜−i] + β,
where β = 2 maxi∈[N ] ρi + λi, and where x′i is a misreported state trajectory from agent i.
Proof: From Lemma 8 we have
E[fi(xi(k))|xi, x−i] ≤ E[fi(xi(k))|x˜i, x−i] + ρi. (19)
Using Theorem 2 and the definition of -joint differential privacy we find
E[fi(xi(k))|x˜i, x−i] ≤ eE[fi(xi(k))|x˜i, x˜−i],
which we substitute into Equation (V) to find
E[fi(xi(k))|xi, x−i] ≤ eE[fi(xi(k))|x˜i, x˜−i] + ρi.
Using e ≤ 1 + 2 for  ∈ (0, 1) gives
E[fi(xi(k))|xi, x−i] ≤ E[fi(xi(k))|x˜i, x˜−i] + 2E[fi(xi(k))|x˜i, x˜−i] + ρi, (20)
were we apply Lemma 7 to get
E[fi(xi(k))|xi, x−i] ≤ E[fi(xi(k))|x˜i, x˜−i] + 2λi + ρi. (21)
A second application of Lemma 8 gives
E[fi(xi(k))|x˜i, x˜−i] ≤ E[fi(xi(k))|x′i, x˜−i] + ρi,
and substituting this inequality into Equation (V) gives
E[fi(xi(k))|xi, x−i] ≤ E[fi(xi(k))|x′i, x˜−i] + β,
as desired. 
While the ρi term in β is a feature of the problem itself, the λi term results directly from the untruthfulness
of agent i, and it is precisely this term which can be influenced using the privacy parameter , allowing a network
operator to directly counteract the influence of false information. Of course, shrinking  requires that more noise
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Fig. 2. A plot of the distance to the saddle point in Problem 0 in the primal space (lower curve) and dual space (upper curve) when all agents
are truthful.
be added which, in general, degrades performance in the system. One must therefore balance the two objectives of
incentivizing truthful information sharing and system performance based upon the needs in a particular application.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
A simulation was run consisting of N = 8 agents each with xi ∈ R2, and m = 4 constraints. The constraint
Xi = [−10, 10]2 for all i ∈ [N ], and fi(xi) = 12‖xi − ti‖22, for all i ∈ [N ]; the value of each ti can be found in
Table I. The constraints used were
g(x) =

‖x1 − x2‖22 + ‖x1 − x3‖22 − 5
‖x4 − x5‖22 + ‖x4 − x6‖22 − 3
‖x7 − x8‖22 + ‖x7 − x6‖22 − 3
‖x5 − x3‖22 + ‖x5 − x7‖22 − 5
 .
The value B = 3 was used for adjacency and the privacy parameter was chosen to be  = ln 3. The distributions
of noise added are shown in Table I; in addition to those values, wg ∼ Lap(327.69). The stepsize and regularization
parameters were chosen to be γk = 0.01k−3/5 and αk = 0.5k−1/3. Two adjacent problems were run for 250, 000
timesteps each, with agent 6 being untruthful in one of them. In that run, agent 6 reported its unconstrained
minimizer t6 to the cloud at each timestep instead of its actual state.
Figure 2 plots the distance to the saddle point in the primal and dual spaces when all agents are truthful. The final
error values were ‖x(250, 000)− xˆ‖2 = 0.5367 and ‖µ(250, 000)− µˆ‖2 = 0.6870, indicating close convergence in
each space despite the large amount of noise in the system.
Figure 3 plots the decrease in cost agent 6 sees in misreporting its state. This decrease is not only bounded by β,
but is bounded above by 0.1β for all time, indicating that β may be loose in some cases; this is not surprising given
that β uses Lipschitz constants and set diameters, which are “worst-case” in the sense that they give maximum values
over all possible states. Nonetheless, the algorithm can be seen both to converge and compute a β-approximate
minimum, indicating that Problem 1 has been solved.
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Fig. 3. A plot of the decrease in cost agent 6 attains through misreporting its state. The ordinate is normalized by β.
i ti Distribution of wi
1 [6 −4]T Lap(10.92)
2 [2 2]T Lap(5.46)
3 [−7 7]T Lap(5.46)
4 [8 −9]T Lap(10.92)
5 [3 −7]T Lap(16.38)
6 [10 10]T Lap(10.92)
7 [−10 −10]T Lap(16.38)
8 [6 −6]T Lap(5.46)
TABLE I
VALUES OF ti AND DISTRIBUTIONS OF wi FOR i ∈ [8].
VII. CONCLUSION
It was shown that joint differential privacy can be used in multi-agent optimization to incentivize truthful
information sharing. Applications of the work presented here include any multi-agent setting in which the iterates
of an optimization algorithm correspond to some physical quantity of interest. Future directions include allowing
asynchronous communications in order to account for systems with communication latency and poor channel quality.
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